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Argument-based reasoning offers promising interaction and computation
mechanisms for multi-agent negotiation and deliberation. Arguments in this
context are typically statements of beliefs or actions related to agents’ sub-
jective values, preferences, and so on. Consequences of such arguments can
and should be evaluated using various criteria, and therefore, it is desirable
that semantics supports these criteria as principles for accepting arguments.
This paper gives an instance of Dung’s abstract argumentation framework to
deal with Pareto optimality, i.e., a fundamental criterion for social welfare.
We show that the instance allows Dung’s acceptability semantics to inter-
pret Pareto optimal arguments, without loss of generality. We discuss the
prospects of justified Pareto optimal arguments and Pareto optimal exten-
sions.
Keywords: argumentation, acceptability semantics, abstract
argumentation frameworks, Pareto optimality
1. Introduction
Dung’s acceptability semantics [4], often called Dungean semantics, gives
unified principles to reformulate consequence notions of various kinds of non-
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Japanese journal paper [3].
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monotonic reasoning. In the last fifteen years, a great number of papers in
the field of argumentation in artificial intelligence have addressed a variety
of problems by means of abstract argumentation frameworks instantiated
with suitable logical languages and inference rules, and demand solutions
from his semantics. Bench-Capon [5] describes that 2000 to 2007 witnessed
an intensive study developing Dung’s theory in various directions. While at
the same time, a number of research have addressed limitations of Dung’s
theory. On the one hand, Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks have
been extended to treat variety of notions associated with argumentation
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10], and on the other hand, Dungean semantics has been refined to
interpret detailed consequence notions of argumentation [11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
Moreover, some researcher argues that limitations of Dung’s theory come
from studying argumentation in an abstract level [16]. However, Dung’s
theory is still well-used semantics due to its generality. It is true that ab-
stractness and generality are two sides of the same coin. In fact, bridging
multidisciplinary fields such as nonmonotonic reasoning, n-person games and
stable marriage problem is impossible without abstract studies of argumen-
tation.
In this paper, we argue that semantics for argumentation should sup-
port welfare criteria for acceptable arguments. Arguments in the context of
multi-agent negotiation or deliberation involve beliefs and actions associated
with values and preferences that differ from an agent to another. In this
context, agents do not necessarily pursue the truth, but can sometimes pur-
sue a common ground or compromise taking into account individual agents’
values or preferences. This observation leads us to the critical opinion that
Dungean semantics and their modifications have no mention of welfare cri-
teria, although they definitely give certain types of criteria for acceptable
arguments. In fact, Prakken [17] sees Dung’s theory as principles to judge
whether propositions are acceptable as true. Moreover, Rahwan and Larson
[18] argue for the importance of welfare semantics for argumentation.
This observation motivates us to figure out the relationship between
Dungean semantics and Pareto optimality. Pareto optimality or efficiency
is known as a fundamental criterion for social welfare and an outcome is said
to be Pareto optimal if no agents can be made better off without making
someone else worse off. For example, outcomes of practical reasoning, i.e.,
reasoning about what to do, are courses of action that an agent or a group of
agents takes, and the decisions depend on desires, aims, or values individual
agents have. So, they are certain to avoid Pareto improvable decisions be-
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cause otherwise there exists another decision that makes some agents better
off and no one worse off.
This paper gives a particular kind of abstract argumentation frame-
works, called Paretian argumentation frameworks. An abstract argumen-
tation framework is a tuple of a set of arguments and a binary relation on
the set. It is abstract in the sense that no internal structures of arguments
nor a basis of attack relations is assumed there. A Paretian argumentation
framework is its specialization in the sense that it is an abstract argumen-
tation framework whose attack relation is substituted by the union of the
inverse complements of agents’ preference relations on the set of arguments.
Namely, attacking is invoked when an argument is not worse than another. In
this paper, we use the word “defeat,” instead of “attack,” with the intention
of expressing not only the original meaning of attacks, i.e., contradiction, im-
plicitly assumed in abstract argumentation frameworks, but also preference
relations between arguments. However, in principle, we do not substitute
the defeat relation into a combination of the preference and attack relations
in order to avoid getting involved with the issue of inconsistency [16], i.e.,
the problem of combining attack and preference relations causing conflict in
extensions. We show that preferred extensions of Paretian argumentation
frameworks coincide with Pareto optimal solutions.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First, we show
the relationships between Dung’s notion of acceptability, emerging from stud-
ies of nonmonotonic logic, and Pareto’s notion of Pareto optimality, emerging
from studies of economics. In particular, we show that Pareto optimality can
be identified by a fixed point of the characteristic function given by Dungean
semantics. This implies the fact that, in a particular case, Dungean seman-
tics gives a preference interpretation in term of Pareto optimality. Second,
we give a foundation for developing multi-agent negotiation and deliberation
dialogues searching for Pareto optimal solutions and their expansions, i.e.,
justified Pareto optimal arguments and Pareto optimal extensions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a motivating example
for Pareto optimality in argumentation. Section 3 defines a Paretian argu-
mentation framework and Section 4 evaluates the framework by relating it
to Pareto optimality. In Section 5, we show prospects of the framework and
discuss related work. In Section 6, we describe conclusions and future work.
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2. Motivating Example
Let us consider simple argument by which agents i and j try to decide
which apartment they buy. They have common concerns about safety, access
to transportation and quietness, but their preferences are different. Agent i
prefers safety rather than quietness and quietness rather than transportation.
Agent j prefers transportation rather than safety and safety rather than
quietness. The following arguments are assumed to be put forward by agents
i and j at some point.
Argument a : We ought to buy apartment A because living in a safe area
is desirable and the apartment is located in a safe area.
Argument b : We ought to buy apartment B because good access to trans-
portation is desirable and the apartment has good access to transporta-
tion.
Argument c: We ought to buy apartment C because living in a quite area
is desirable and the apartment is located in a quite area.
Which apartment should rational agents buy, or more generally, what is the
consequence of this argument? We think that rational agents are at least
certain to decide to buy a socially good apartment. Pareto optimality is a
fundamental criterion for goodness, and a solution is Pareto optimal if no
agents can be made better off without making someone else worse off. In
the above example, buying apartment A or B, i.e., accepting argument a
or b, is Pareto optimal because i prefers safety to quietness, and quietness
to transportation, while j prefers transportation to safety, and safety to
quietness.
Our idea is to characterize arguments a and b supporting Pareto opti-
mal solutions as arguments in an extension, i.e., as arguments successfully
defended from defeating arguments. We will show that this is achieved by
substituting the inverse complement of agents’ preference relations on the set
of arguments, into the defeat relation of an abstract argumentation frame-
work. Namely, the defeat relation is substantiated with the idea that an
argument is not worse than another. For example, a defeats c, c defeats b
and a defeats b for agent i because a is not worse than c, c is not worse than
b and a is not worse than b for i, in terms of i’s preference on arguments. On
the other hand, b defeats a, a defeats c and b defeats c for agent j in terms of
j’s preference. Figure 1 shows the abstract argumentation framework where
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Figure 1: Interpretation of Pareto optimal-
ity based on an abstract argumentation
Figure 2: Consideration on justification of
arguments
the defeat relation is substantiated by the union of their defeat relations.
For readability, each arrow has an extra information specifying whose defeat
relation activates. It is the case that both a and b are successfully defended
from defeating arguments, but c is not.
Now, we further the idea that consequences of argument about what to
do depend on consequences of argument about what to believe. For example,
let us consider the following argument put forward by agent j.
Argument d : Apartment A is not located in a safe area because a murder
occurred and the murderer is still at large.
Now, which apartment should rational agents buy? Argument a fails to
justify buying apartment A in terms of Dungean semantics. In fact, a is
not in any extension because it is defeated by argument d, but no argument
defeats d. Figure 2 shows this situation where the defeat relation from d
to a represents contradiction, but not preference. In terms of both Pareto
optimality and Dungean semantics, it is obvious that buying apartment B or
C, i.e., accepting argument b or c, becomes Pareto optimal because although
j prefers b to c, agent i prefers c to b. What is interesting here is that
argument c becomes Pareto optimal only by considering theoretical argument
d. The new semantics evaluates b and c as acceptable on the ground that they
are Pareto optimal within justified arguments, i.e., justified Pareto optimal
arguments.
In this paper, we assume that arguments in our framework can be divided
into theoretical arguments and practical arguments. The latter ones repre-
sent options/choices (e.g. buying apartment A, B, or C) over which agents
have preferences, and these preferences are translated into defeat relations
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according to these agents. On the other hand, agents do not have prefer-
ences over theoretical arguments. Those arguments exist to defeat/reinstate
other practical arguments (e.g. argument d in this example). Theoretical
arguments can defeat theoretical and practical arguments while practical
arguments can only defeat practical arguments (by translating preference re-
lations). All agents agree on the (non-)existence of defeats from theoretical
arguments, unlike the defeats between practical arguments.
3. Paretian Argumentation Frameworks
This section aims to introduce a Paretian argumentation framework. It is
defined as a particular kind of an abstract argumentation framework. Dung’s
theory of abstract argumentation [4] reformulates consequence notions of var-
ious sorts of nonmonotonic reasoning. It gives four kinds of argumentation-
theoretic notions of extensions called preferred, stable, grounded and com-
plete extensions, defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Abstract argumentation). [4] An abstract argumentation
framework is a pair AF = 〈AR, defeats〉 where AR is a set of arguments,
and defeats is a binary relation on AR, i.e. defeat ⊆ AR× AR.
• A set S ⊆ AR of arguments is said to be conflict-free if there are no
arguments a, b ∈ S such that a defeats b, i.e., (a, b) /∈ defeat, for all
a, b ∈ S.
• An argument a ∈ AR is acceptable with respect to a set S ⊆ AR of
arguments iff for each argument b ∈ AR: if b defeats a then b is defeated
by an argument in S.
• A conflict-free set of arguments S is admissible iff each argument in S
is acceptable with respect to S.
• A preferred extension of AF is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
admissible set of AF .
• A conflict-free set of arguments S is called stable extension of AF iff S
defeats each argument which does not belong to S.
• The characteristic function, FAF : Pow(AR) → Pow(AR), of AF is
defined by FAF (S) = {a | a is acceptable with respect to S}.
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• The grounded extension of AF is the least fixed point of FAF .
• An admissible set S of arguments is called a complete extension of AF
iff each argument, which is acceptable with respect to S, belongs to S.
Each preferred, stable, grounded and complete extension is said to be an
extension given by preferred, stable grounded and complete semantics, re-
spectively, and we collectively call them Dungean semantics.
We assume an arbitrary but fixed abstract argumentation framework
AF = 〈AR, defeat〉. In addition, we assume a set of agents and agent’s
preference relation defined as a preorder, i.e., a binary relation satisfying re-
flexivity and transitivity1. AG denotes the set of agents and %i⊆ AR× AR
denotes the preference relation, for all i ∈ AG. As usual, the complement
of %i is denoted and defined as 6%i= {(x, y) ∈ AR × AR|(x, y) /∈%i} and
the inverse of %i is -i= {(x, y) ∈ AR × AR|(y, x) ∈%i}. So, the inverse
complement of %i is denoted and defined as 6-i.
Now, we define a particular kind of abstract argumentation frameworks,
called Paretian argumentation frameworks.
Definition 2 (Paretian argumentation framework). A Paretian argu-
mentation framework is a pair AF = 〈AR, defeat〉 where AR is a set of
arguments and defeat =
⋃
i∈AG 6-i.
A Paretian argumentation framework is characterized by the defeat relation
defined as the union of the inverse complements of agents’ preference rela-
tions.
Example 1. Consider the set of arguments, agents’ preference relations de-
fined as follows.
AR = {a, b, c, d}
%i = {(a, a), (b, b), (c, c), (d, d), (b, a), (b, d), (c, a), (c, b), (c, d)}
%j = {(a, a), (b, b), (c, c), (d, d), (a, c), (a, d), (b, a), (b, c), (c, d), (b, d), (d, c)}
Note that the preference relations are preorder, but not partial order. In fact,
c %j d and d %j c are the case, but c 6= d. Thus, AF = 〈AR, 6-i ∪ 6-j〉 is a
1Normally, a preference relation is assumed to be a partial order, i.e., a binary relation
satisfying reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity. We, however, relax it to develop our
idea as general as possible.
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Figure 3: Paretian argumentation framework 〈AR, 6-i ∪ 6-j〉
Paretian argumentation framework where 6-i and 6-j are defined as follows.
6-i = {(a, d), (b, a), (b, d), (c, a), (c, b), (c, d), (d, a)}
6-j = {(a, c), (a, d), (b, a), (b, c), (b, d)}
Figure 3 shows AF represented by a directed graph where each node rep-
resents an argument and each edge from x to y represents either x 6-i y or
x 6-j y.
4. Correctness of Paretian Argumentation Frameworks
Welfare economics is a branch of economics that is concerned with the
evaluation of alternative economic situations (states, configurations) from the
point of view of the society’s well being [19]. One of fundamental criteria for
evaluating society’s well being is Pareto optimality, or Pareto efficiency. Let
O be a set of outcomes, I be a set of agents and ≥i be agent i’s preference
represented by a partial order, i.e., a binary relation satisfying reflexivity,
antisymmetry and transitivity, on O. The notion of Pareto optimality is
defined on the notion of Pareto dominance.
Definition 3 (Pareto dominance). An outcome o1 ∈ O Pareto domi-
nates outcome o2 ∈ O iff, for all i ∈ I, o1 ≥i o2 and there exists j ∈ I
such that o1 >j o2.
An outcome is said to be Pareto optimal if no outcome dominates it. In
Pareto optimal outcomes, no agents can be made better off without making
someone else worse off.
Definition 4 (Pareto optimality). An outcome o1 ∈ O is Pareto optimal
(or Pareto efficient) iff o1 is not Pareto dominated by any ouctome in O.
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In order to develop our idea as general as possible, we relax the preference
relation assumed in the definition of Pareto optimality to a preorder.
Now, we start analyzing relationships between Pareto optimality and
Dung’s semantics.
Lemma 1. Let AF = 〈AR, defeat〉 be a Paretian argumentation frame-
work. An argument a ∈ AR is in a preferred extension of AF iff {a} is an
admissible set.
Proof. (⇐) From Definition 1, a preferred extension is a maximal admis-
sible set. So, if {a} is admissible then there exists a preferred extension S
such that {a} ⊆ S. (⇒) We show that the contradiction is derived from the
assumptions that a is in a preferred extension S and {a} is not admissible.
Under the assumptions, there exists an argument b ∈ AR defeating a, that is
not defeated by a and is defeated by a third argument c ∈ S \{a}. Formally,
the following formula holds.
∃b ∈ AR∃c ∈ S.(b, a) ∈ defeat ∧ (a, b) /∈ defeat ∧ (c, b) ∈ defeat (1)
Since the complement of defeat is transitive, the following formulae hold.
∀a, b, c ∈ AR.(a, b) /∈ defeat ∧ (c, a) /∈ defeat→ (c, b) /∈ defeat
⇔ ∀a, b, c ∈ AR.(a, b) /∈ defeat ∧ (c, b) ∈ defeat→ (c, a) ∈ defeat (2)
The following formula is derived from (1) and (2).
∃b ∈ AR.(b, a) ∈ defeat ∧ ∃c ∈ S.(c, a) ∈ defeat (3)
(3) implies (c, a) ∈ defeat where a, c ∈ S. This contradicts the assumption
that S is conflict-free. 
The following lemma shows the relationship between admissible sets of ar-
guments and Pareto optimality.
Lemma 2. Let O be a set of outcomes, I be a set of agents, and %i be i’s
preference represented by a preorder on O, for all i ∈ I. o ∈ O is Pareto
optimal iff {o} is an admissible set in the Paretian argumentation framework
〈AR, defeat〉 where AR = O and defeat = ⋃i∈I 6-i.
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Proof. Based on the assumption that %i is a preorder, we show that the
outcome o in an admissible set turns out to be Pareto optimal.
@i ∈ I (o 6-i o) ∧ ∀o1 ∈ O(∃i ∈ I (o1 6-i o)→ ∃j ∈ I (o 6-j o1 ))
⇔ ∀o1 ∈ O(∃i ∈ I (o1 6-i o)→ ∃j ∈ I (o 6-j o1 ))
⇔ ∀o1 ∈ O(∃i ∈ I (o1 i o ∨ o 6-i o1 ∧ o1 6-i o)→ ∃j ∈ I (o 6-j o1 ))
⇔ ∀o1 ∈ O(∃i ∈ I (o1 i o)∨
∃k ∈ I (o 6-k o1 ∧ o1 6-k o)→ ∃j ∈ I (o 6-j o1 ))
⇔ ∀o1 ∈ O((∃i ∈ I (o1 i o)→ ∃j ∈ I (o 6-j o1 ))∧
(∃k ∈ I (o 6-k o1 ∧ o1 6-k o)→ ∃l ∈ I (o 6-l o1 )))
⇔ ∀o1 ∈ O(∃i ∈ I (o1 i o)→ ∃j ∈ I (o 6-j o1 ))
⇔ @o1 ∈ O(∃i ∈ I (o1 i o) ∧ ∀j ∈ I (o -j o1 )) (4)
(4) is equivalent to the definition of Pareto optimality. 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let O be a set of outcomes, I be a set of agents, and %i be i’s
preference relation represented by a preorder on O, for all i ∈ I. o ∈ O is
Pareto optimal iff o is in a preferred extension of the Paretian argumentation
framework AF = 〈AR, defeat〉 where AR = O and defeat = ⋃i∈I 6-i.
Theorem 1 shows that evaluation of Pareto optimal solutions can be trans-
lated to evaluation of preferred extensions of a particular Paretian argumen-
tation framework. In other words, preferred semantics credulously justifies
Pareto optimal solutions.
5. Discussions on Paretian Argumentation Frameworks
5.1. Prospect on Justified Pareto optimal arguments
Paretian argumentation frameworks have the ability to make Pareto op-
timality to more realistic. Basically, Pareto optimality implicitly assumes
mutually incompatible solutions and no reason nor justification supporting
the solutions is considered. By contrast, handling Pareto optimality by Pare-
tian argumentation frameworks allows us to evaluate Pareto optimal solutions
supported by a justified reasons. This idea is developed on a combination
of Paretian argumentation framework and Dung’s abstract argumentation
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framework where Dungean semantics interprets Pareto optimal arguments
in the former framework and justified arguments in the latter.
We assume that a practical argument is informally distinguished from a
theoretical argument where a practical argument is intuitively explained as
an argument whose conclusion is a statement about a proposal related to
an action, while a theoretical argument is an argument whose conclusion is
a statement about proposition related to truth. A formal distinction needs
internal structures of arguments, but they are beyond the scope of this pa-
per. We only show examples of practical and theoretical arguments and
assume disjoint sets Targ ⊆ AR of theoretical arguments and Parg ⊆ AR
of practical arguments taken as given.
Example 2. The following statement is a practical argument.
Living in a safe area is desirable. An apartment A is located in a
safe area and living at A is sufficient for us to live in a safe area.
Therefore, we ought to live at the apartment A.
The following statement is a theoretical argument.
The apartment A is not located in a safe area because a murder
occurred in the area and the murderer is still at large.
It is natural to think that practical arguments cannot defeat theoretical ar-
guments although theoretical arguments can defeat both theoretical and
practical arguments. Formally, we assume an attack relation attack ⊆
Targ× (Targ∪Parg) to represent incompatibility between arguments. It is
also natural to assume that agents have preferences on practical arguments.
Formally, we assume a preorder %i⊆ Parg × Parg to represent agent i’s
preference, for all agents i ∈ AG. We now consider the abstract argumenta-
tion framework AF ∗ and Paretian argumentation framework F ∗ defined as
follows.
AF ∗ = 〈Targ ∪ Parg, attack〉




Theorem 1 implies the fact that preferred extensions of F ∗ coincide with
Pareto optimal arguments. We combine a Paretian argumentation framework
and an abstract argumentation framework where the set of arguments in
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Figure 4: F ∗↓{t,v,q,r} obtained by combining AF
∗ and F ∗
the Paretian argumentation framework is restricted to justified arguments in
the abstract argumentation framework. A notion of restriction is defined as
follows.
Definition 5 (Restriction). Let AF = 〈AR, defeat〉 be an abstract argu-
mentation framework and S ⊆ AR be a set of arguments. The restriction
of F to S, denoted by F↓S, is defined as the tuple 〈AR ∩ S, defeat∗〉 where
defeat∗ = defeat ∩ (S × S).
We define a justified Pareto optimal argument as a Pareto optimal arguments
restricted to justified arguments.
Definition 6 (Justified Pareto optimal argument). a ∈ AR is a justi-
fied Pareto optimal argument iff a is in a preferred extension of F ∗↓S where S
is the grounded extension of AF ∗.
Example 3. Figure 4 shows examples of AF ∗ = 〈Targ ∪
Parg, attack〉 and F ∗ = 〈Parg,AG,⋃i∈AG 6-i〉 where Targ =
{t, u, v}, Parg = {p, q, r}, attack = {(t, p), (u, q), (v, u)},
%i= {(p, p), (q, q), (r, r), (p, q), (p, r), (q, r), (r, q)} and %j=
{(p, p), (q, q), (r, r), (p, q), (p, r), (q, r)}. We can see that {t, v, q, r} is
the grounded extension of AF ∗. Figure 4 also shows the restriction of F ∗
to {t, v, q, r}, i.e., F ∗↓{t,v,q,r} = 〈{q, r}, {(q, r)}〉. We can see that {q} is the
preferred extension of F ∗↓{t,v,q,r}. Therefore, q is the justified Pareto optimal
argument. Note that no consideration on justification yields p as a Pareto
optimal argument since {p} is the preferred extension of F ∗.
12
5.2. Prospect on Pareto optimal extensions
In general, different agents can have conflicting views of acceptable argu-
ments even though they see the same argumentation. So if the argumenta-
tion is taken place in the context of consensus building or agreement making,
then a certain kind of criterion is required to reconcile conflicts. Pareto op-
timality is an effective criterion for the purpose and we show that combining
Pareto optimality with Dung’s extensions allows agents to choose Pareto
optimal extensions in terms of society’s well-being. We assume that each
agent has a preference on sets of arguments, and it is defined as a preorder
%i⊆ Pow(AR) × Pow(AR), for all i ∈ AG. We now consider the abstract
argumentation framework AF+ and Paretian argumentation framework F+
defined as follows.





Theorem 1 implies the fact that preferred extensions of F+ coincide with sets
of Pareto optimal sets of arguments. We combine a Paretian argumentation
framework and an abstract argumentation framework where the power set of
the set of arguments in the Paretian argumentation framework is restricted
to extensions of the abstract argumentation framework. A notion of a Pareto
optimal extension is defined as Pareto optimal sets of arguments where the
sets of arguments are restricted to extensions.
Definition 7 (Pareto optimal extension). S ∈ Pow(AR) is a Pareto
optimal extension iff S is a preferred extension of F+↓T where T is a set of
extensions of AF+.
Example 4. Figure 5 shows examples of AF+ = 〈AR, defeat〉 and F+ =
〈Pow(AR),⋃i∈AG 6-i〉 where AR = {a, b}, defeat = {(a, b), (b, a)},
%i= {(∅, ∅), ({a}, {a}), ({b}, {b}), ({a, b}, {a, b}), ({a, b}, {a}), ({a, b}, {b}),
({a, b}, ∅), ({a}, {b}), ({a}, ∅), ({b}, {a}), ({b}, ∅)} and %j= {(∅, ∅),
({a}, {a}), ({b}, {b}), ({a, b}, {a, b}), ({a, b}, {a}), ({a, b}, {b}), ({a, b}, ∅),
({a}, {b}), ({a}, ∅), ({b}, ∅)}. We can see that ∅, {a} and {b} are all exten-
sions of AF+. Figure 5 also shows the restriction of F+ to {∅, {a}, {b}}, i.e.,
F+↓{∅,{a},{b}} = 〈{∅, {a}, {b}}, {({a}, {b}), ({a}, ∅), ({b}, ∅)}〉. We can see that
{a} is the preferred extension of F+↓{∅,{a},{b}}. Therefore, {a} is the Pareto
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Figure 5: F+↓{∅,{a},{b}} obtained by combining AF
+ and F+
optimal extension. Note that no consideration on extension yields {a, b} as
a Pareto optimal set of arguments since {a, b} is the preferred extension of
F+.
5.3. Related work
Some researchers working on argumentation-theoretic semantics intro-
duce nonclassical semantics such as stage semantics [11], semi-stable seman-
tics [12], ideal semantics [13], CF2 semantics [14], prudent semantics [15], and
so on. These semantics are defined on Dung’s abstract AF (argumentation
frameworks) and aim to overcome or improve some limitations or drawbacks
of Dungean semantics. Others extend Dung’s abstract AF to value-based AF
[6], preference-based AF [7, 8], bipolar AF [9], extended AF [10], and so on.
These frameworks aim to enhance expressive power of argumentation frame-
works taking into account various attributes pertaining to argumentation
such as values, preferences, supports, attacks to attacks, respectively. Our
Paretian AF is motivated by our novel idea relating Dung’s theory and Pareto
optimality. In particular, we agree with the standpoints on value-based and
preference-based AF [6, 7] that consideration on values and preferences is
necessary for handling persuasiveness. However, this paper does not stand
on the position that values and preferences can cancel out inconsistency. This
is consistent with the claim [8] that handling preferences in argumentation
frameworks can cause a problem of inconsistency. The main thesis in this
paper is that extensions of Paretian argumentation frameworks coincide with
Pareto optimal arguments when defeat relations are appropriately instanti-
ated by preference relations. The problems of how to instantiate arguments
to avoid inconsistency are outside the scope of this paper.
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Rahwan and Larson [18] argue for the need for welfare semantics for
argumentation and explore the relationships between extensions defined by
Dungean semantics and Pareto optimality. Dung and Thang [20] also intro-
duce the notion of Pareto optimality in a process of argument-based nego-
tiation. However, identifying Pareto optimal solutions themselves is not a
subject for computation in their research.
Paretian AF is applicable to argument-based deliberation. Deliberation is
a type of dialogue in which a group of agents or a single agent tries, through
looking at a set of alternatives, to make a decision about which course of
action among the possible alternatives to take [21]. Many argument-based
approaches for deliberation or practical reasoning apply Dungean seman-
tics as a fundamental principle for evaluating acceptable arguments. For
instance, a problem of deciding single agent’s course of action is formalized
as instantiations of abstract argumentation frameworks where the agent has
more than one desires. In fact, Bench-Capon and Prakken [22] propose two
kinds of practical reasoning, positive and negative practical syllogisms, de-
riving desirable and undesirable actions, respectively. Dungean semantics
is used for evaluating arguments, and consequently decides what the best
action is. Prakken [23] gives a combined formalization for skeptical epis-
temic reasoning interleaved with credulous practical reasoning. The paper
distinguishes practical arguments from theoretical arguments by informally
dividing logical formulas into epistemic and practical ones. Epistemic and
practical arguments are evaluated by skeptical, i.e., grounded, semantics and
credulous, i.e., preferred, semantics defined by Dungean semantics, respec-
tively. Although these research handle practical reasoning in argumentation,
they do not discuss the relationship to efficiency. We think that a decision
of a course of action and the notion of efficiency are inseparable even when
argumentation by single agent.
The welfare acceptability semantics is also applicable to argument-based
negotiation requiring concession or compromise. Sawamura et al. [24] in-
troduce seven dialectical inference rules on dialectical logic DL and weaker
dialectical logic DM [25] to realize concession and compromise from incon-
sistent theory. Their argument-based negotiation mechanism equipped with
the inference rules helps agents to reach agreement from conflict situations.
Kido et al. [26] propose reasoning for compromise on a lattice, and illustrate
that compromise arguments incorporating the reasoning realize compromise-
based justification. Amgoud et al. [27] propose an abstract framework for
argument-based negotiation, and introduce the notion of concession as an es-
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sential element of negotiation. Fan and Toni [28] develop assumption-based
frameworks and propose a dialogue-based mechanism for conflict resolution.
Their mechanism allows agents to make concession by incorporating oth-
ers’ knowledge, i.e., concession rules. However, none of them discuss the
relationship between Pareto optimality with the notions of concession and
compromise. We think that concessions and compromises should be chosen
from Pareto optimal solutions.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced a Paretian argumentation framework as an important in-
stance of Dung’s abstract argumentation framework. We showed that pre-
ferred extensions of Paretian argumentation frameworks coincide with Pareto
optimal arguments. We embodied the idea of justified Pareto optimal argu-
ments and Pareto optimal extensions by combining abstract argumentation
frameworks and Paretian argumentation frameworks.
One interesting future work will be applications of Paretian argumenta-
tion frameworks to dialogue games and formal dialogue systems. The attempt
will allow agents to dialectically search for and argue about justified Pareto
optimal solutions and Pareto optimal extensions.
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